The position of the shadow Attorney General: why Labour’s attack misses the mark

If professional lawyers and advocates could act only for those whose views they shared, some people would find it hard to obtain representation.  In consequence, it is a mark of a free society, in which everyone is entitled to legal representation, that lawyers are not to be identified with their clients’ causes. Amongst the many people who have recently overlooked that principle is the Prime Minister.

William Knatchbull, whose writing on the Law Officers has previously been published by the Society, deplores Labour’s recent attack on Lord Wolfson of Tredegar KC, the shadow Attorney General. 

During Prime Minister’s Questions on Wednesday 7 January 2026, the Prime Minister made the following remark in response to a question from the Leader of the Opposition:

“She has in her shadow Cabinet a shadow Attorney General who is advising Abramovich at the same time as we are imposing sanctions on Russia and trying to use that money to support Ukraine. How can someone sit in her shadow Cabinet advising someone trying to escape sanctions, and pretend that their policy is to support us on sanctions?”  [emphasis added]

This was followed by a second remark:

“The Leader of the Opposition talks about the shadow Attorney General, of course, I accept that lawyers have to represent all sorts of crime, of course, I accept that principle. The question is whether the shadow Attorney General can sit in the shadow Cabinet when the Conservative party says it supports us on sanctions. We want the money from Chelsea football club to go to Ukraine. I am not sure whether that is the Leader of the Opposition’s position. If it is her position, presumably it is something they discuss in the shadow Cabinet, advised by a shadow Attorney General who is representing the very man whose money we want to send to Ukraine. If she cannot see the conflict of interest in that, then she shows no judgment and no leadership at all—the same old.” [emphasis added]

Before turning to analyse these statements, it is both noteworthy and welcome that the offices of Attorney General and shadow Attorney General are, for the first time after a considerable period, occupied by two King’s Counsel of substantial experience and standing in private or employed practice. This, as argued previously by the author and the House of Lords Constitution Committee, always ought to be the case.

In response to the Prime Minister, on 7 January Lord Wolfson published a letter setting out five issues he took with the accuracy of the Prime Minister’s remarks. The first  and final being that, as is explored below, Lord Wolfson is not a member of the shadow Cabinet and that lawyers ought not to be identified with the causes of their clients. The other objections were based on the fact that the litigation in which Lord Wolfson is instructed relates to a distinct matter regarding Jersey data protection rights and claims arising thereafter. The matter does not relate to UK sanctions or the proceeds of the sale of Chelsea FC.

The Prime Minister’s attack is based on three premises:

1. The Attorney General sits in, and is a member of, the Cabinet. The corollary to this being that the shadow Attorney General sits in, and is a member of, the shadow Cabinet.

2. The Attorney General and shadow Attorney General are bound by collective responsibility in all matters.

3. The role of shadow Attorney General is a mirror to that of the Attorney General.

This article aims to show that as a matter of constitutional principle and fact the first premise is false. Further, as a matter of constitutional practice, the second and third premises are arguably misconceived. Once this is accepted the Prime Minister’s argument collapses.

The matter should be assessed by reference to the ordinary rules governing conflicts of interest where a practising member of the Bar, as the shadow Attorney General is, advises multiple clients. Further, the attack, regardless of its truth, offends the principle that lawyers are not to be identified with the causes of their clients.

The Law Officers’ place outside the Cabinet

Premise 1

As a matter of fact neither the Attorney General nor shadow Attorney General are members of the Cabinet or shadow Cabinet. This fact reflects the long established convention that the Attorney General is a member of the Government but not the Cabinet.  The traditional approach, as exemplified by the accounts of previous Attorneys General including Lord Mayhew of Twysden and Sir Peter Rawlinson[1], is that the Law Officers only attend Cabinet when invited to do so when the need for legal advice arises. It is true that other Attorneys General have followed the approach, particularly associated with Lord Silkin, of regular attendance of Cabinet meetings so as to keep abreast of government business and likely legal issues.

The House of Commons Library’s overview of the role of Law Officers has this to say:

“Although the Attorney General’s attendance at Cabinet has, in theory, been wholly by invitation, in practice he or she attends routinely. In 2015, in evidence to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee, the then AGEW Jeremy Wright said the post’s invitation to attend Cabinet was effectively a standing one. To the best of his awareness, he and his predecessor, Dominic Grieve, had been invited to, and accepted all invitations to attend, every Cabinet meeting since May 2010. All of Wright’s successors have indicated that they attended every, or almost every, Cabinet meeting during their tenure.” 

According to Baroness Scotland KC (a former Attorney General) the more recent practice of Attorneys General being routinely invited or possessing a standing invite to attend Cabinet meetings dates to a 2005 decision of the then Prime Minister. The development is not  surprising, owing to the increasing centrality of (domestic and international) legal issues in matters of government and the increasing role of  the Law Officers, after the 2005 reforms of the role of the Lord Chancellor, in guarding the rule of law in Government.

It is clear that whilst not in government the shadow Cabinet’s need for legal advice is far lower. It is unsurprising if holders of that role conform to the 2007 recommendation of the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, that:

 “The Attorney General should attend the Cabinet by invitation only, and then only for the consideration of specific relevant agenda items.”

Based on Lord Wolfson’s letter, this is exactly the approach he takes to discharging his duty as shadow Attorney General.

Collective responsibility and the (shadow) Attorney General’s role regarding policy

Premise 2

Labour’s attack on the shadow Attorney General originated not with the Prime Minister but with Justice Minister, Jake Richards MP. On 31 December 2025 Jake Richards appeared on Times radio where he said:

“I have absolutely no issue with a lawyer representing Roman Abramovich or indeed anyone, everyone has the right to legal representation and advice. I do, however, have an issue when that lawyer also serves as shadow Attorney General, a senior figure of the shadow Cabinet in his Majesty’s Opposition, advising the Leader of the Opposition on policy from across the board but that must also include the Russian-Ukraine Conflict. There is a clear conflict of interest there. Lord Wolfson has a professional duty to Roman Abramovich, a sanctioned oligarch and friend of Vladimir Putin and at the same time he is advising the Leader of the Opposition on policy in this same space. That cannot be right. Now it can only be right if Kemi Badenoch says well actually, we are not going to have any collective policy on Roman Abramovich or the sanctions that the Government has imposed on certain individuals. I don’t think that’s her position. Simply put, she can’t have her cake and eat it. You can’t have Lord Wolfson advising Roman Abramovich on one hand and also advising her on the other, it’s simply wrong.”  [emphasis added]

He further elaborated:

“Picture the scene, there is a shadow Cabinet meeting, Kemi Badenoch asks for views about what the Conservative Party policy should be on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, on sanctioned individuals and  about reclaiming some of these assets. She goes round the room and at the same time Lord Wolfson is getting paid by Roman Abramovich to represent his interest in litigation on this very subject. It could not be a clearer conflict of interest.” [emphasis added]

As explained above the shadow Attorney General is not a member of the shadow Cabinet. More significantly the above suggests that the Attorney General or shadow Attorney General would, when attending Cabinet or shadow Cabinet meetings, participate openly in general policy discussions and be subject to collective Cabinet responsibility. This suggestion is wrong.

The Shadow Attorney General’s letter confirms that he conforms to the approach, set out above, that the Attorney attends to present their requested legal opinion then leaves. In a more general sense Richard’s remarks are not true of Attorneys General because they elide legal questions and the bearing they may have on policy with political and policy questions themselves.

It should go without saying that the Law Officers advise on legal questions. The answers they give will invariably have a bearing on policy outcomes. Where an Attorney General advises there is no respectable argument as a matter of domestic law for a policy, owing to the developing convention regarding the binding nature of law officer’s opinions, they will have put pay to the policy. However, they have not engaged in a general policy discussion. They have answered a legal question in a highly political context where the legal answer has a political implication.

Even though the Law Officers are not members of Cabinet perhaps the Government suggest they are still bound in all matters by collective ministerial responsibility. This is a convention whereby individual members of the Government are accountable for the actions and decisions of the Government as a whole.

The current version of the Ministerial Code provides, regarding collective responsibility, that:

“Decisions reached by the cabinet or ministerial committees are binding on all members of the government. They are, however, normally announced and explained as the decision of the minister concerned. On occasion, it may be desirable to emphasise the importance of a decision by stating specifically that it is the decision of His Majesty’s Government. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule. Ministers also have an obligation to ensure decisions agreed in cabinet and cabinet committees (and in write rounds) are implemented. Ministers should take special care in discussing issues which are the responsibility of other ministers, consulting ministerial colleagues as appropriate.”

The Cabinet Manual, more accurately, provides that collective responsibility is:

“The principle that decisions made by Cabinet or Cabinet committees are binding on all government ministers, save where collective agreement is explicitly set aside.

The flexibility of the convention was exemplified when it was set aside twice in 2016, for reasons of political expediency, in relation to  the Brexit referendum and the building of a third runway at Heathrow Airport.

Regarding the relation between the Law Officers and the convention of collective responsibility, in 2008 the House of Lords Constitution Committee concluded that:

“it is important to note that the Attorney’s responsibilities for legal advice and individual prosecutions are non-ministerial. In these roles, he or she is not subject to collective responsibility and must act independently of the Government.”

This was based on the previous conclusions of the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee and the evidence of Professor Jeffrey Jowell and Professor Anthony Bradley. Paragraph 19 of Professor Bradley’s evidence is particularly instructive for current purposes:

“To summarise, a re-statement of the conventions that apply to the office of Attorney General should emphasise that, for many functions of the office, the Attorney has individual responsibility to Parliament and that his or her decisions do not engage the collective responsibility of the Government. While the Attorney gives advice to ministers, departments and the Cabinet as required, he or she is not to be identified with ministerial or Cabinet decisions.”  [emphasis added]

If the above is accepted, it renders the second premise of Labour’s attack false. The attack specifically offends the last sentence quoted from Professor Bradley. They seek to identify Lord Wolfson with the shadow Cabinet’s position, supporting the Government’s policy on sanctions, and place that in tension with Lord Wolfson’s engagement to advise Roman Abramovich in a discrete matter in a foreign jurisdiction not regarding UK sanctions. Finally, they seek to attribute that artificially created tension back to the shadow Cabinet itself, suggesting it cannot be their position that they support the Government on sanctions and the redeployment of the Chelsea FC sale proceeds. This is a non-sequitur based on a flawed understanding of constitutional practice.

The peculiarity of the role of shadow Attorney General (premise 3)

The shadow Cabinet itself is not a mirror image of the Cabinet. It is of much later coinage emerging in the second half of the twentieth century and with the leader of the Opposition only being formally recognised by Parliament in 1932. Its access to the machinery of the state and funding is far less than that of the Government.

In a comparison between the roles of Attorney General and the shadow Attorney general there are significant asymmetries. The role of Attorney General is multi-faceted in that they: are the chief legal advisor to the Crown (not just the Cabinet or the Government), superintend the CPS, SFO and the CPS Inspectorate, have various functions in relation to devolution legislation and legislation in general (where it may be in tension with the Human Rights Act 1998 or have retrospective effect), have various ‘public interest functions’ in relation to charities and some particular types of prosecutions,  have responsibilities on behalf of Parliament where questions of Parliamentary Privilege arise in litigation and it remains the case that the House of Commons is entitled to rely on the assistance of the Law Officers in relation to the potential legal implications of proposed legislation.

With all these functions it is unsurprising the role of Attorney General is full-time. Professor Edwards charts, in ‘the Law Officers of the Crown (1964, Ch 6), how the entitlement of the Attorney General to take on private clients was curtailed in 1892. The shadow Attorney General is under no such restriction and for good reason. The reality of the role of shadow Attorney General is different.

They do not generally shadow their opposite number in the same way as other shadow ministers do. This is a consequence of much of the work of the Attorney General being confidential and privileged. The role of shadow Attorney General is in reality limited largely to only one function, that is to provide legal advice to the shadow Cabinet when requested. In theory the holder of the role is the one who will become Attorney General if the Leader of the Opposition were invited to form a Government. However, the recent case of Tortoise Media v the Conservative Party [2025] EWCA Civ 673 and the appointment of Lord Hermer over the previous holder, bar one, of the role of shadow Attorney General in 2024 show there is nothing automatic about this process.

If Lord Wolfson was asked to serve as Attorney General in a Conservative Government and he accepted the request he would not then be able to retain  Mr Abramovich, or for that matter any other individual, as a client.

The regulatory position regarding conflicts

Having dispelled the misconceptions advanced by several ministers, it is clear that to the extent that there is a conflict of interest it is assessed and resolved by reference to the rules of the Bar Standards Board’s Code of Conduct, rC21 of which provides:

“You must not accept instructions to act in a particular matter if: …

.3 there is a conflict of interest, or real risk of conflict of interest, between the prospective client and one or more of your former or existing clients in respect of the particular matter unless all of the clients who have an interest in the particular matter give their informed consent to your acting in such circumstances;”

Guidance to this rule provides that:

“where there is a conflict of interest between an existing client or clients and a prospective client or clients or two or more prospective clients, you may be entitled to accept instructions or to continue to act on a particular matter where you have fully disclosed to the relevant clients and prospective clients (as appropriate) the extent and nature of the conflict; they have each provided their informed consent to you acting; and you are able to act in the best interests of each client and independently as required by CD2 and CD4.”

Those who advanced this attack have failed to explain, perhaps because they were relying on the mistaken premise that the shadow Attorney General is in the shadow Cabinet, why if it is expressly envisaged that barristers can act where there is a conflict of interest between two clients the situation here is any different. That is unless the difference is that, contrary to constitutional practice and the principle discussed below, they wish to conflate the causes of a client of Lord Wolfson with him and by extension the shadow Cabinet.

The non-identification of lawyers with their clients

Returning to the statements of the Prime Minister, he said “how can someone sit in her shadow Cabinet advising someone trying to escape sanctions, and pretend that their policy is to support us on sanctions?” This might be taken to suggest that Lord Wolfson was advising Roman Abramovich in a case regarding sanctions with the UK Government on the other side. Lord Wolfson’s letter clarifies that such a suggestion would be false. The alternative meaning of the remark is that Roman Abramovich is someone trying to escape sanctions and Lord Wolfson is advising him in a distinct matter.

While the first meaning, in light of Lord Wolfson’s letter, would possibly amount to the House having been misled, the second meaning clearly offends principle 18 of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, which provides:

"Lawyers shall not be identified with their clients or their clients' causes as a result of discharging their functions.”

In this case, as a result of advising Roman Abramovich in any capacity, regarding any matter, the shadow Attorney General has been equated with his stance on sanctions and on the proceeds of Chelsea FC. The further step in Labour’s argument is that because the shadow Cabinet receives legal advice from Lord Wolfson they cannot maintain that they support sanctions. How far will this principle extend? If the shadow Attorney General happened to be involved in defending an individual accused of a serious criminal offence would the Government be saying the shadow Cabinet cannot possibly maintain they are against the robust punishment of those found to be guilty of said offence?

This is not a correct or bountiful road to travel down. As stated at the outset of this article it is a good thing that both the Cabinet and shadow Cabinet are advised by experienced KCs. As the shadow Attorney General is not a full-time role we may, if we continue to elide them with the causes of some of their other clients, find that experienced practitioners of significant reputation are not able or willing to take up the role. The country would be poorer for it. This analysis applies equally to similar attacks that were made on the Attorney General, regarding his previous clients, since he took office.

[1]Sir Peter Rawlinson, “A Vital Link in the Machinery of Justice”, (1977) 74 Guardian Gazette 203.

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William Knatchbull is a barrister at 3 Hare Court, with a mixed civil, commercial and public law practice. He was awarded the Richard Yorke scholarship by the Honourable Society of Gray's Inn and the Lyell Scholarship by the Society of Conservative Lawyers.

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The Society of Conservative Lawyers, an association of lawyers who support or are sympathetic to the aims of the Conservative Party. Members hold a range of different views within those parameters and the views expressed in its publications are only those of their authors, and not necessarily held by all members of the Society or by the Conservative Party. The views expressed in this post are those of the authors alone, who take sole responsibility for all errors and omissions.